RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Insurance-Trustee's Right to Benefits under Disability Policy-

[United States].-The bankrupt insured his life, making his wife the beneficiary and
reserving the right to change the beneficiary. Attached to the life policy was a supple-

mentary contract which provided that if the insured should become totally disabled,
he was to receive a monthly annuity. In this contract also, the insured retained the
right to change the beneficiary. Prior to the bankruptcy, the bankrupt became totally
disabled and began to receive monthly payments on the disability insurance. The

trustee conceded that the life policy was exempt under the Tennessee statute (Tenn.
Code § 8456 (1932)) but contended that the obligation of the insurance company to
make future disability payments passed to the trustee. The Circuit Court of Appeals
gave judgment for the trustee. On appeal, held, affirmed. Legge v. St. Johns, 56 Sup.
Ct. 336 (1935).
Section 7o(a)(5) of theBankruptcyAct, 32 Stat. 8oo (19o3), ii U.S.C.A. 11o (1927),
vests in the trustee the title to "property which prior to the filing of the petition he
could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him. Provided, when any bankrupt shall have any
insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or
personal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has
been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or
secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and
carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution
of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the
trustee as assets; ..... " The obligation of the insurance company to make disability
payments, having arisen before the filing of the petition, was held to be property which
the bankrupt "could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied
upon," and so passed to the trustee. Accord: In re Matschke, 193 Fed. 284 (D.C. N.Y.
1912); In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. N.Y. 1934). Similarly, an annuity on which
the annuitant has made all payments before the petition in bankruptcy has always
been held to pass to the trustee as property vested in the bankrupt. In re Burtis, 188
Fed. 527 (D.C. N.Y. I911). Rights under the disability policy are like any other
rights, acquired by the bankrupt before bankruptcy, to receive payment thereafter;
and such rights pass to the trustee even though the amount be indefinite. In re
Wright, 157 Fed. 544 (C.C.A. 2d 1907) (contract to receive commissions on renewal for
a term of years after bankruptcy); In re Evans, 253 Fed. 276 (D.C. Tenn. 1918) (wages
earned before the petition to be paid thereafter). Even contingent remainders that
are transferable under state law are considered property falling within § 70(a) (5).
Clowe v. Seavey, 2o8 N.Y. 496, 102 N.E. 521 (1913). But expectancies do not pass to
the trustee. In re Baker, 13 F. (2d) 707 (C.C.A. 6th 1926).

In the principal case, the bankrupt contended that his disability policy fell within
the proviso of § 70(a) (5) and that since it had no cash surrender value, no interest in
it ever passed to the trustee. Decisions of the Supreme Court have established the
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rule that the proviso of § 70(a) (5) standing alone is the only source of the trustee's
rights to a bankrupt's life insurance; that the trustee gets no title to life policies but is
entitled only to the cash surrender value thereof. Burlinghamv. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459
(1913). An earlier view was contra, 3 Remington, Bankruptcy § 1243 (3 d ed. 1923).
The bankrupt insisted that his disability policy was like life insurance in this respect
and indeed the proviso is not in terms limited to life insurance. But in previous cases
the Supreme Court had interpreted the proviso as limiting the rights of creditors to
the cash surrender value solely for the purpose of giving protection to the bankrupt's
dependents after his death. Burlinghamv. Crouse, 228 U..S. 459 (913). In the instant
case the court declined to find in the proviso any protection for the insured or his
dependents during his life.
The bankrupt next argued that the disability policy was merely supplemental to
his contract of life insurance and was so integrated with and dependent on the latter
that it took on the character of the life policy. This theory of integration has been used
to bring disability insurance within state statutes exempting life insurance. Baranovich v. Horwatt, 113 Pa. 467, 173 Atl. 676 (i934). But these decisions are illustrations
of a very liberal construction of state statutes (see infra) treating exemptions for the
benefit of a debtor and have no parallel in previous decisions construing § 70(a) (5).
It seems that the court in the instant case was correct in holding that the two kinds of
insurance were two distinct contracts. The disability policy could have elapsed without terminating the life policy; and the hazards of each were different.
Under § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy courts must apply state exemption
statutes. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 202 (1905). Most states have insurance exemption statutes. Some of these expressly exempt matured disability policies. Section
55B, N.Y. Ins. Laws, c. 626 (1934); Pa. Pub. L. 276 (40 P.S. § 766). The Tennessee
statute failg to do so expressly but exempts annuities made for the "benefit of, or assigned to the wife and/or children or dependent relatives" of the insured whether or
not the insured reserved the right to change the beneficiary. Tenn. Code 1932 § 8458.
The court in the instant case held that the policy was not within this statute because
the insured, rather than his wife or dependents, was the beneficiary. This result shows
a narrow interpretation of the statute. Under the statute which reads "whether or not
the right to change the .... beneficiary is reserved," if the insured had named his
wife as beneficiary, he would have retained the policy even though he reserved the
right to change the beneficiary. See Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances § 181 (ig3).
And he could have changed the beneficiary to himself after bankruptcy. See It re
Vaughn, 2 F. Supp. 385 (D.C. Fla. 1932). Therefore, where as in the instant case the
right to change is retained, it should make no difference who is named beneficiary.
Cf. Houston v. Maddux, 178 Ill. 377, 53 N.E. 599, 6o2 (1899). The court properly considered the matured disability policy an annuity. The typical annuity arises from an
investment by the annuitant of a certain sum until a fixed future date from which time
the annuitant receives monthly payments until his death. A disability policy is an
annuity which differs from the typical only in the fact that part of its value (that above
the premiums) arises from the insured's becoming disabled. Since the difference only
makes the disability policy less harmful to creditors, the legislature could not have
intended to exclude such a policy. A Tennessee appellate court has held that disability
benefits under a health insurance policy are not exempt because disability insurance is
not life insurance. Cravens v. Robbins, 8 Tenn. App. 435 (1928). But in that case no
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reference was made to that section of the statute which exempts annuities. And the
Tennessee Supreme Court has been liberal in construing its exemption statutes. Rose
v. Wortham, 95 Tenn. 505, 32 S.W. 458 (1895). See In re Stansell, 8 F. (2d) 363 (D.C.
Tenn. 1925).
The statutes of most states exempt only life insurance. But most courts under
these statutes have exempted not only the proceeds of the insurance on the insured's
death but also the cash surrender value of the policy during his life even though the
statutes are ambiguous. Inre Stansell, 8 F. (2d) 363 (D.C. Tenn. 1925); In re Phillips,
7 F. Supp. 807 (D.C. Pa. 1934); Contra, In.re Grant, 21 F. (2d) 88 (D.C. Wis. 1927).
In these jurisdictions there is some probability that the life insurance exemption will be
stretched to include disability insurance because (i) disability deprives the insured of
the capacity to earn a living which is detrimental to himself, his dependents and the
community; (2) by exempting the cash surrender value of life policies, these courts
have already construed these statutes as making available to the insured a sum of
money free from the claims of his creditors; (3) exemption statutes are to be construed
liberally (Hickman v. Hanover,33 F. (2d) 873 (C.C.A. 4 th 1929)); (4) disability insurance, in the form of a supplementary contract to a life policy might be considered so
integrated with the life policy that the disability insurance takes on the character of
life insurance. Baranovichv. Horwatt, 113 Pa. 467, 173 At. 676 (1934). But see contra,
Cravensv. Robbins, 8 Tenn. App. 435 (1928); ChattanoogaSewer Pipe Works v. Dumler,
153 Miss. 276, 120 So. 450 (1929); Baxter v. Old Nat'l City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189
N.E. 514 (1933).
In many endowment policies the insured pays premiums until a certain date at
which time he becomes the beneficiary of an annuity; and if he dies before that time a
third person gets only the amount of premiums paid in plus interest. Such contracts
are not life insurance, but investments (Vance, Insurance 153 (2d ed. 193o)) and have
been held not to come within a statute exempting only life insurance. Moskowitz v.
Davis, 68 F. (2d) 818 (C.C.A. 6th 1934). But where an endowment policy provided
that on the death of the insured before the endowment matured, the beneficiary was to
get a stated sum irrespective of the amount of premiums paid in by the insured, the
policy was held to be life insurance and so within the exemption statute. li re Weick,
2 F. (2d) 647 (C.C.A. 6th 1924). The cash surrender value of such a policy is greater
than that on a straight life policy because premiums paid are building up a future
annuity. This excess represents an investment which, if standing alone, would go to
creditors under Moskowitz v. Davis,supra. If the mere fact that the investment feature
is combined with a life insurance feature will exempt an annuity, certainly a matured
disability policy'which is incidental to a life policy should be exempt. But see Baxter v.
Old Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N.E. 514, 517 (I933) (same statute but analogy
not raised).
Business Trusts-Liability of Trust Estate on Ultra Vires Contracts-Unjust Enrichment-[Massachusetts].--The plaintiff, under a contract with one of two trustees,
installed the plumbing in an apartment building belonging to a business trust. The
co-trustee authorized the construction work but did not sign the contract. The contracting trustee failed to insert a clause exempting himself from personal liability as
directed by the recorded trust instrument. When the contracting trustee became insolvent, the plaintiff sued in equity to reach the trust estate. Held, recovery denied;

